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LIST OF PARTIES

The following are parties to this appeal:
1.

Defendant/Appellant Keith Smith

2.

Plaintiff/Appellee Sharon Smith

,.C'
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code §78A-4-103.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue: Did the District Court err by interpreting the Smith Family Trust provision

dividing financial accounts as not applying to the financial accounts held by Sharon
Smith at the time of the divorce?
Preservation of Issue: This issue was argued by counsel in closing arguments at trial,

and is plainly shown in the Trial Court's final orders that are the subject of this appeal.
R.181: 129-131 (Trial Transcript); R.165-166(Decree of Divorce); R.157-159(Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law).
Standard
of Review: The interpretation of an unambiguous trust instrument is a question
,.t

of law, which is reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the ruling of the district
court. See Hull v. Wilcock, 2012 UT App 223, ,JiJ 27-28, 285 P.3d 815, 823.
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS

There are no governing constitutional or statutory provisions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves an appeal from a divorce action in the Third District Court,
Judge Robert Adkins presiding (the "Trial Court"). Petitioner Sharon Smith (referred to
herein as '"Sharon" for the sake of clarity) filed a Petition for Divorce on October 25,
2013. The Trial Court held a bench trial on February 2, 2015. At the resolution of the
bench trial, the Trial Court granted a divorce and made findings and rulings regarding the
division of property, among other things. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a
1
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Decree of Divorce were entered on March 26, 2015. The Appellant, Keith Smith
(referred to herein as "Keith") filed a Notice of Appeal on April 21, 2015.
At issue in this appeal is the property division regarding two brokerage accounts
totaling approximately $593,000 held in Sharon's name. The Trial Court ruled that they
were Sharon's separate property, based upon the Trial Court's erroneous interpretation of
the Smith Family Trust, which by its plain terms should make such accounts joint
property, divided equally between the parties.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married on December 15, 1979. R.156. On September 22, 2006,
the parties executed the Smith Family Trust, including Schedule A thereto. Trial Ex. 2,
pg. 25, R.181 :92-93(Trial Tr.). The Smith Family Trust was drafted by an_ att~flley
retained by Sharon. R.181 :25, 55-56 (Trial Tr.). The Smith Family Trust, executed
during the course of the marriage, included a provision (the "Financial Accounts
Provision") in which Sharon quitclaimed to Keith one-half of
The following accounts in the following institutions, together with all
future additions, interest or accumulations therein and also including all
new accounts and the accumulations and the future additions, interest or
accumulation in any and all other financial institutions in which new
accounts are opened in the future ... "
Trial Ex. 2, pg. 29. The Schedule then allocated to Sharon
all right, title and interest in and to the following: All interest of Sharon
L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, an
Arizona Limited Partnership.
(referred to herein as the "Limited Partnership"). Id. At the time, all distributions from
the Limited Partnership were going into joint accounts for common marital use-exactly

2
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•

what the Financial Accounts Provision requires. R.181 :58(Trial Tr.). Approximately six
years after signing the Smith Family Trust, Sharon received a distribution from the
Limited Partnership and deposited that money in 1) a newly opened Zions Bank account
with a balance of $171,068.19 at the time of the divorce, and 2) An LPL Financial
account (previously Edward Jones) with a balance of $422,159.21 at the time of the
divorce (the "Brokerage Accounts"). R.181 :33-34, 52(Trial Tr.). At trial, the Court did
not find that the Smith Family Trust was ambiguous, but did rule that the two provisions
cited above were conflicting, and ruled that the financial account provision did not apply
to the financial accounts containing the distribution from the Limited Partnership. R.165166(Divorce Decree).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In 2006 the parties signed the Smith Family Trust, which contained a provision
that split all financial accounts equally between the parties. The Trial Court interpreted
that provision as not applying to the Brokerage Accounts in Sharon's name. That
interpretation was error, as the Brokerage Accounts were subject to that provision under
the plain language of the Smith Family Trust. The Trial Court's error is also
demonstrated by the operation of the Smith Family Trust as a whole, and the extrinsic
evidence of the parties' conduct. Accordingly, the Trial Court's ruling on the
interpretation of the Smith Family Trust and the division of the Brokerage Accounts
should be reversed and remanded with instructions to split the Brokerage Accounts
equally between the parties.

3
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ARGUMENT

The sole issue in this appeal is the proper division of two financial accounts, a
Zions Bank money market account and an LPL brokerage account, both held in
Petitioner's name (the "Brokerage Accounts").

In 2006, Sharon and Keith executed a

Smith Family Trust, which provided that they would equally split
The following accounts in the following institutions, together with all
future additions, interest or accumulations therein and also including all
new accounts and the accumulations and the future additions, interest or
accumulation in any and all other financial institutions in which new
accounts are opened in the future ... "
Trial Ex. 2, pg. 29 (the "Financial Accounts Provision"). There is no argument about the
effectiveness or enforceability of the Smith Family Trust. In breach of this agreement,
Sharon argued that the Brokerage Accounts were her sole and separate property because
.

.t

the funds therein (at least most of them) came from distributions from her Limited
Partnership, an inherited asset. The Smith Family Trust also mentions the Limited
Partnership, and states that Sharon alone is entitled to "All interest of Sharon L. Smith in
and to Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership."
Trial Ex. 2, pg. 29. The Court interpreted the Financial Accounts Provision as not
applying to the Brokerage Accounts, based on the Court's belief as to the origin of the
funds in the Brokerage Accounts and its interpretation of the Financial Accounts
Provision as not applying to financial accounts whose funds originated from the Limited
Partnership. The entire oral ruling of the Court on the subject (which is consistent with
the written order), is as follows:

4
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~

In trying to reconcile Exhibit A to the Smith Family Trust, the Court is
looking at No. 4 on Exhibit A, and it says, "All interest, title and interest
in the following," and then it says, "All interest of Sharon L. Smith in
the Lavida Fincher Family Limited Partnership, an Arizona limited
partnership," and that was to go to Mrs. Smith. The Court believes that
all interest in the - of Sharon L. Smith in the Lavida Fincher Family
Limited Partnership included distributions. That they were simply part of
the partnership, and the Court is interpreting No. 4 to mean all those
distributions were Ms. Smith's. The Court believes that the language in
No. 2 at Exhibit A was for other assets, but did not include the interest in
the Lavida Fincher Family Limited Partnership.
R.181: 146(Trial Tr.); R.165-166. In making this ruling, the Trial Court did not find that
the Smith Family Trust was ambiguous in any way, and no party argued that it was.
Moreover, the Trial Court did not rely on any extrinsic evidence in its ruling. Rather, the
ruling was solely a legal interpretation of the language of an unambiguous trust-a legal
conclusion that this Court reviews for correctness. The Trial Court's interpretation was
.

··'

in error. The language of the Financial Account Provision is clear and is not susceptible
to the limitation imposed by the Trial Court. The Brokerage Accounts are clearly
"financial accounts" equally divided between the parties, and this Court should reverse
the portion of the Trial Court's order awarding the Brokerage Accounts solely to Sharon
and remand to the Trial Court to split those Brokerage Accounts equally between the
parties.

I. The Trial Court Erred By Interpreting the Financial Accounts Provision As Not
Applying to the Brokerage Accounts.
When interpreting a trust, the Court's primary object is "to carry out the intent of
the trustor or trustors." Hull v. Wilcock, 2012 UT App 223, ,, 27-28, 285 P.3d 815,823
(quoting In re Gerber, 652 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1982)). Where the trust is written, "the

5
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intention of the settlor must be ascertained from the language thereof, and the court may
not go outside of the language in an effort to give effect to what it thinks the intent was."
Makoff v. Mako.ff, 528 P.2d 797, 798 (Utah 1974); see also Hull, 2012 UT App 223 at

1127-28 (Court should determine the trustors' intent solely from the language of the trust

instrument, and "may only look beyond that language if the trust is ambiguous." (internal
citations omitted)). "If the language within the four comers of the [trust] is
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the [trust]
language, and the [trust] may be interpreted as a matter oflaw." Hull, 2012 UT App 223
at 1127-28 (quoting McNeil Eng'g & Land Surveying, LLC v. Bennett, 2011 UT App 423,
18, 268 P.3d 854).
.t

To determine whether a trust is ambiguous, Utah Courts apply the same standards
that are applied to other contracts. See Mako.ff, 528 P .2d at 798. Utah Courts "consider
each [trust] provision ... in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to
all and ignoring none." Hull, 2012 UT App 223 at 1127-28 (quoting McNeil Eng'g, 2011
UT App 423, 18, 268 P.3d 854). "A [trust] term or provision is ambiguous if it is capable
of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms,
missing terms, or other facial deficiencies." Id.
The Smith Family Trust at issue is not ambiguous, and was interpreted by the Trial
Court as a matter of law. The interpretation chosen by the Trial Court was erroneous, as
it cannot be reconciled with the actual language of the Smith Family Trust.

6
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A. The Smith Family Trust is Not Ambiguous and Was Interpreted as a Matter
of Law.
This Court may interpret the Smith Family Trust de novo as a matter of law, as the
Smith Family Trust is not ambiguous. Neither party ever argued that the Smith Family
Trust was ambiguous, and the Trial Court did not find that it was. Rather, the Trial Court
interpreted the language of the Smith Family Trust as a matter of law, and did not
consider any extrinsic evidence. Because the Trial Court's interpretation was a legal
matter, this Court reviews it de novo and gives no deference to the Trial Court's legal
conclusions. See Hull, 2012 UT App 223 at 121.
This would be the correct result in any event, as the language of the Smith Family
Trust at issue here is clear and unambiguous. The provision at issue, the Financial
Accounts Provision, reads as follows:
The following accounts in the following institutions, together with all
future additions, interest or accumulations therein and also including all
new accounts and the accumulations and the future additions, interest or
accumulation in any and all other financial institutions in which new
accounts are opened in the future ... "
Trial Ex. 2, pg. 29 ( emphasis added). There are no missing terms, uncertain terms, or
other facial deficiencies in the language, and Sharon has never argued that there are. See

Hull, 2012 UT App 223 at 1127-28. The Financial Accounts Provision states that it
covers "all new accounts .. .in any and all other financial institutions in which new
accounts are opened in the future ... " This language is comprehensive and allencompassing, and leaves no room for any financial accounts to be excluded for any

7
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reason. No ambiguity exists, and this Court is free to interpret the Financial Account
Provision as a matter of law.
B. The Financial Accounts Provision Applies to the Brokerage Accounts.
The Trial Court interpreted the language of the Financial Accounts Provision to
exclude accounts where the funds originated from distributions from the Limited
Partnership. R.165-166. This was error. The language of the provision does not
contemplate any exclusions at all, and cannot be read as distinguishing accounts based on
the origin of the funds. When interpreting a contract, Utah Courts apply the ordinary and
usual meaning of the words that are used. See S. Ridge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Brown,
2010 UT App 23, 11, 226 P.3d 758, 759. In addition, a correct interpretation will
harmonize and give effect to all of the provisions, and not favor one over the other. See
.t

Hull, 2012 UT App 223 at 1127-28. The literal language of the Financial Accounts
Provision applies to all existing and future financial accounts of any kind at any financial
institution-period. There is no room in the language to carve out the Brokerage
Accounts. It was error for the Trial Court to interpret such a carve-out into the
provision-effectively rewriting it post hoc for Sharon's benefit. Utah Courts "will not
make a better contract for the parties than they have made for themselves" or "'avoid the
contract's plain language to achieve an 'equitable' result." Bakowski v. Mountain States
Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, 1 19, 52 P.3d 1179, 1185. Notably, the provision as written
applies equally to both parties, is not onerous or one-sided, and is a rational division of
assets (as it was when it was executed). It is only now, where the Financial Accounts
Provision does not benefit her in this divorce, that Sharon wishes it to contain a carve-out
8
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in her benefit. The Trial Court's interpretation, which it perhaps viewed as equitable
under the circumstances, is not correct or sustainable under the actual language of the
instrument. Accordingly, the Trial Court's ruling should be reversed in that respect.
C. The Limited Partnership Provision Is Not Rendered Meaningless By Giving
Effect to the Financial Accounts Provision.
The Trial Court accepted Sharon's argument that the provision of the Smith
Family Trust allocating the Partnership Interest to her would be nullified if the Financial
Accounts Provision were given effect. That provision allocates to Sharon
all right, title and interest in and to the following: All interest of Sharon
L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, an
Arizona Limited Partnership.
Sharon's argument is that distributions from the Limited Partnership are the "interest"
that she has, and dividing financial accounts whose funds originated from those
distributions (even in part) would divest her of that interest. This is not true. An interest
in a partnership is a bundle of rights-the right to control the partnership, direct the use
of its assets, obtain information from the partnership, enjoy the tax benefits of losses and
deductions, and receive both cash and in-kind distributions, among other things. See
generally Arizona Rev. Stat. §29-301 et seq. All of those rights remained, and still
remain, with Sharon, and are not impacted at all by the Financial Accounts Provision.
Even the receipt of a cash distribution is not impacted by the Financial Accounts
Provision. Sharon could take the distribution in cash, reinvest it, spend it, or anything
else. However, once Sharon placed it in a financial account, the account was joint
property and half of the account belonged to Keith. This is the limited area in which
9
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Sharon agreed to give away that benefit of the Limited Partnership, but it does not render
the provision meaningless. Also, as previously mentioned, that impact applied equally to
both parties. Keith's inheritances or business earnings were equally divisible once placed
into a financial account. The Financial Accounts Provision is fair and rational, and its
implementation does not conflict with, or render meaningless, any other provision of the
Smith Family Trust.
D. The Extrinsic Evidence Also Supports Reversal.
Finally, even if the Court were inclined to review extrinsic evidence, either to
inform it about potential ambiguity or to reach the intent of the parties, that evidence
supports Keith's interpretation. The Smith Family Trust was executed in 2006, and was
written by an attorney retained by Sharon. R.181:25, 55-56(Trial Tr.). At the time, all
.

.,

distributions from the Limited Partnership were going into joint accounts for common
marital use-exactly what the Financial Accounts Provision requires. R.181 :58(Trial
Tr.). The parties' actual conduct at the time the Smith Family Trust was executed is
some of the most reliable indicia of intent-more so than Sharon's trial testimony as to
her undisclosed subjective intent. See KeyBank Nat. Ass'n v. Sys. W. Computer Res., Inc.,
2011 UT App 441, ,r 18,265 P.3d 107, 112. That course of conduct confirms that the
parties intended financial accounts to be jointly owned, regardless of the origin of the
funds. It also confirms that sharing distributions does not divest Sharon of the enjoyment
of her Limited Partnership Interest, or she presumably would not have shared them in
2006.

10
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CONCLUSION
Because the Trial Court's interpretation is not supported by the plain language of
the Smith Family Trust, does not harmonize its provisions, does not reflect the parties'
intent, and is even unsupported by the extrinsic evidence, the Trial Court's ruling
interpreting the Smith Family Trust should be reversed and remanded to divide the
Brokerage Accounts equally between the parties.
DATED this 25 th day of November, 2015.
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C.

By:_~_--=3LJ__
_ _ __
Michael D. Black
Attorneys for Appellant
.. t
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•
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.

.• t

12

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.• t

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

THE SMITH FAMILY TRUST
INCLUDING

THE KEITH L. SMITH TRUST AND
THE SHARON L. SMITH TRUST

ARTICLE I

t

(~)

TRANSFER IN TRUST
For good and valuable consideration, the Trustors, Keith L. Smith and Sharon L.
Smith, husband and wife, of Grantsville, State of Utah, hereby transfer and deliver to the
Trustees and their successors the property listed in Schedule "A", annexed hereto and
incorporated herein by reference, to have and to hold the same, and any cash,
securities or other property which the Trustees may, pursuant to any of the provisions
hereof, at any time hereafter hold or acquire, all of such property being hereinafter
referred to collectively as the "Trust Estate", for the uses and purposes and upon the
terms and conditions herein set forth.

ARTICLE II
ADDITIONS TO TRUST
It is understood that the Trustors or any other person may grant and the
A.
Trustees may receive, as part of this Trust, additional real and personal property by
assignment, transfer, deed or other conveyance, or by any other means, testamentary
or inter vivas, for inclusion in the Trust herein created.
B.
The Smith Family Trust shall be divided into two separate Trusts, The
Keith L. Smith Trust and The Sharon L. Smith Trust. Any additional property received
by the Trustee shall become a part of the Trust into which It is transferred and shall
become subject to the terms of this Agreement. If such property is not specifically
appointed to any particular Trust, it shall be allocated equally between The Keith L.
Smith Trust and The Sharon L. Smith Trust, if both of the Trustors are living, and
otherwise to the Shelter Trust set forth herein. Property held in the name of "THE
SMITH FAMILY TRUST' shall be allocated equally between the two Trusts and shall be
subject to the respective provisions in the next two sentences. Property held as "THE
KEITH L. SMITH TRUST11 is the exclusive property of Keith L. Smith, and Sharon L.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-~

,,..-...._

vi;

<__)

Smith hereby expressly waives all interests, including community property interests and
separate property interests, therein. Property held as "THE SHARON L. SMITH
TRUSTn is the exclusive property of Sharon L. Smith, and Keith L. Smith hereby
expressly waives all interests, including community property interests and separate
property interests, therein.
C.
Unmatured life insurance policies transferred to the Trust at the death of
either of the Trustors shall be allocated to the Shelter Trust and shall be under control of
the Trustees of that Trust, except if the insured is a Trustee of that Trust; then the
control shall rest solely in the Co-Trustee named or with the successor Trustees named
after the insured.

ARTICLE Ill
SIGNATURES

~

The Truster, Keith Lance Smith, has signed his name and is known by his whole
name or by a portion thereof only or by a certain combination of names and the initials
thereof. The Truster, Sharon Lynn Smith , has signed her name and is known by her
whole name or by a portion thereof only or by certain combinations of names and initials
thereof, and also by the name o1Jv1rs. Keith L. Smith, and a portion only of said name or
the initials thereof. Regardless of what combinations of the names and signatures of
the Trustors appear on past, present or future written documents, the names and
signatures of the Trustors, as written below, are intended by the Trustors and shall be
effective to transfer and convey the property listed in said written documents into this
Trust.

ARTICLE IV
GOVERNING LAW
vj

(rd}

The validity of this trust and the construction of its beneficial provisions shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Utah in force from time to time. Questions with
regard to the construction and administration of the trusts contained in this Agreement
shall be determined by reference to the laws of the State in which the trust is then
currently being administered.
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ARTICLEV
NO BOND REQUIRED

No Trustee named herein need give bond in any jurisdiction. If a fiduciary's bond
may not be dispensed with, the Trustors request that the bond be accepted without
surety and in the lowest possible amount. In the absence of breach of trust, no Trustee
shall ever be required to qualify before, be appointed by, or account to any court, or
obtain the order or approval of any court in the exercise of any power or discretion
herein given.

ARTICLE VI
REVOCATION AND AMENDMENT
A.
As long as both of the Trustors are alive, each of them reserves the right,
without the consent or approval of the other, to amend, modify or revoke their separate
Trusts under this Agreement, in whole or in part including this Trust, concerning the

property that each has contributed to the Trust, in whole or in part, also including the
principal and the present or past undisbursed income from such principal. Such
revocation shall be by an instrument in writing signed by the Trustors and shall be
effective upon signing without notice to any successor Trustee. After the first of the
Trustors has died, the survivor may amend or revoke only the Survivor's Trust
provisions pertaining to the assets transferred therein by the surviving Truster, and may
not, however, amend or revoke the QTIP Marital Trust. The Shelter Trust shall continue
as an irrevocable Trust and will be administered and distributed as set forth herein. On
the death of the survivor of the Trustors. the remainder of the Trust Estate and the
Trusts created hereinafter shall become irrevocable.
B.
While any of these Trusts remain revocable, the Trustors may, in their
discretion, make such use of the funds or properties of these Trusts as they may deem
prudent, and such use shall be deemed to have been made with the consent and
approval of the Trustees as though a formal writing were submitted in accordance with
the provisions above.
C.
The interest of the beneficiaries is a present interest which shall continue
until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death. As long as this Trust
subsists, the Trust properties and all rights and privileges thereunder shall be controlled
and exercised by the Trustees named herein.

3
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ARTICLE VII

0

STATEMENT OF INTENTION

It is specifically the intention of the Trustors that all real and personal properties
now owned by the Trustors are to be a part of this Trust; provided further, that all future
real and personal properties acquired by the Trustors are to be a part of, or to
automatically become a part of, this Trust at the time acquired by the Trustors.

ARTICLE VIII
INEFFECTUAL PROVISIONS

If any provision of this Trust Agreement is unenforceable, the remaining
provisions, nevertheless, shall be carried into effect.

ARTICLE IX
GENDER

In any provision of this Trust Agreement, the masculine includes the feminine
and vice versa, and the neuter includes the masculine or feminine and vice versa.
Where applicable, the singular includes the plural and vice versa.

Q.

.. t

ARTICLEX
PERPETUITIES SAVINGS CLAUSE

In any event, and anything to the contrary herein contained notwithstanding, the
Trust created in this Agreement shall be subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities in
place in the jurisdiction governing this trust.
In the event of the termination of this Trust as provided for herein, the Trustee
shall distribute the Trust Estate as it shall then be constituted, together with any net
income, to the beneficiaries then entitled to the income from the Trust Estate, in the
same proportions in which they are entitled to such income.

ARTICLE XI
SPENDTHRIFT PROVISION

After any of the Trusts created herein becomes irrevocable, the interests of each
beneficiary in income and principal shall be free from the control or interference of any
creditor of such beneficiary or the spouse of a married beneficiary, or the parent of a
child beneficiary, and shall not be subject to attachment or be subject to assignment
4
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either voluntarily or involuntarily. Each and every beneficiary under this Trust and the
various estates created hereunder is hereby restrained from and shall be without right,
power or authority to sell, transfer, assign, pledge, mortgage, hypothecate, alienate,
anticipate, bequeath or devise, or in any manner affect or impair his, her or their
beneficial right, title, interest, claim and estate in and to either the income or principal of
any trust created hereunder, or to any part thereof, during the entire terms of said trusts;
nor shall the right, title, interest or estate of any beneficiary be subject to any right,
claim, demand, lien or judgment of any creditor of any such beneficiary, nor be subject
nor liable to any process of law or equity, but all of the income and principal, except as
otherwise provided in this Trust Agreement shall by the Trustee be payable and
deliverable to or for the benefit of only the named and designated beneficiaries, as set
forth in this trust agreement, and receipt by such beneficiaries shall relieve the Trustee
from responsibility for such good faith distributions. This spendthrift clause shall not be
construed to limit in any way the survivor of the Trustors' rights to income or principal
under the Shelter Trust or the Marital Trust.

ARTICLE XII
PARTIES DEALING WITH TRUSTEES

0

No purchaser and no issuer of any stock, bond or other instrument evidencing a
.
.t
---·
deposit of money or property, or other person dealing with the Trustees tiereunder with
respect to any property hereunder, as purchaser, lessee, party to a contract or lease or
in any other capacity whatsoever, shall be under any obligation whatsoever to see to
the disbursing of money paid to the Trustees or to the due execution of this Trust in any
particular1 but such persons shall be absolutely free in dealing with the Trustees on the
same basis as though the Trustees were the absolute owner of the said property,
without any conditions, restrictions or qualifications whatsoever.

ARTICLE XIII
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

When a Trustor is unable or unwilling to serve as Trustee under this Trust
Agreement due to death, resignation or incompetence, the remaining Truster shall serve
as Trustee.
When the original Trustors are unable or unwilling to serve as Trustee under this
Trust Agreement due to death, resignation or incompetence, the successor Trustees in
5
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the order of succession set forth in Article XXVII shall serve as Trustees. For all

·O

purposes of this Trust, each Trustee shall continue to be deemed mentally competent,
unless determined not to be competent by two physicians selected by the Co-Trustee or
the successor Trustee. The physicians shall not be liable for any determination made
as to the competency of the Trustee if the determination is made in a reasonable
manner.

ARTICLE XIV
POWER OF THE TRUSTEES
A.

The Trustees shall have full power to do everything in administering these

Trusts that they deem to be for the best interests of the beneficiaries (whether or not it
be authorized or appropriate for fiduciaries but for this broad grant of authority)
including, but not limited to, the following:
1.

To buy, sell and trade in securities of any nature, including short

sales and on margin, and for such purposes may maintain and operate margin
accounts with brokers, and may pledge any securities held or purchased by them
with such brokers as security for loans and advances made to the Trustees, and
to acquire by purchase or otherwise and to retain, so long as they deem

0

advisable, any kind of realty or personal property or undivided interests therein,
including common and preferred stocks, bonds or other unsecured obligations,
options, warrants, interests in limited partnerships, investment trusts and
discretionary common trust funds, all without diversification as to kind or amount,
without being limited to investments authorized by law for the investment of trust
funds, and power to hold or take title to property in the name of a nominee;
2.

To sell for cash or on credit, at private or public sale, exchange,

hypothecate, sell short or otherwise dispose of any real or personal property;
3.

To make distributions as authorized in this Trust Agreement,

including distributions to themselves as Trustees, in kind or in money or partly in
each, even if shares be composed differently. For such purposes, the valuation
of the Trustees shall be given effect, if reasonably made;
4.

To withhold from distribution, in the Trustee's discretion, at the time

for distribution of any property In this trust, without the payment of interest, all or
any part of the property, as long as the Trustee shall determine in the Trustee's
discretion that such property may be subject to conflicting claims, to tax

6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

deficiencies, or to liabilities, contingent or otherwise, properly incurred in the

0

administration of the estate.
5.

If, in the Trustees' discretion, any beneficiary (whether a minor or of

legal age) is incapable of making proper disposition of any sum of income or
principal that is payable or appointed to said beneficiary under the terms of this
Trust Agreement, the Trustees may apply said sum to or on behalf of the
beneficiary by any one or more of the following methods: by payments on behalf
of the beneficiary to anyone with whom the beneficiary resides, by payments in
discharge of the beneficiary's bills or debts, including bills for premiums on any
insurance policies, or by paying an allowance to a beneficiary directly. The
foregoing payments shall be made without regard to other resources of the
beneficiary or the duty of any person to support the beneficiary and without the
intervention of any guardian or like fiduciary; provided, however, that the
Trustees shall insure and see to the application of the funds for the benefit of the
beneficiary, so that the funds will not be used by any adult person, or any other
person for a purpose other than the direct benefit of the beneficiary, and
particularly so that said funds will not be diverted from the purpose of support
and education of said beneficiary;

0

6.

To determine whetl)er and to what extent receipts should be

deemed income or principal, whether or to what extent expenditures should be
charged against principal or income," and what other adjustments should be
made between principal and income, provided such adjustments do not conflict
with well-settled rules for the determination of principal and income questions;
7.

To delegate powers to agents including accountants, investment

counsel, appraisers! legal counsel, and other experts, remunerate them and pay
their expenses, to employ custodians of the trust assets, bookkeepers, clerks
and other assistants and pay them out of income or principal;
8.

To execute or enter into contracts, deeds, agreements or any other

documents of any nature whatsoever which the Trustees deem necessary or
desirable to carry out the provisions and purposes of the Trusts, to renew,
assign, alter, extend, compromise, release, with or without consideration, or
submit to arbitration or litigation, obligations or claims held by or asserted against
the Trustors, the Trustees or the trust assets;
9.

To borrow money from others or from the Trustees, for the payment

of taxes, debts or expenses, or for any other purpose which, in the opinion of the

0
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Trustees, will facilitate the administration of these Trusts, and pledge or
mortgage property as security for any such loans, and if money is borrowed from
any Trustee Individually, to pay interest thereon at the then prevailing rate of
interest;
10.

To lend money to any person, including the probate estate of either

Truster, provided that any such loan shall be adequately secured and shall bear
a reasonable rate of interest.
11.

To lease, or grant options to lease, for periods to begin presently or

in the future, without regard to statutory restrictions or the probable duration of
any Trust, to erect or alter buildings or otherwise improve and manage property,
demolish buildings, make ordinary and extraordinary repairs, grant easements
and changes, make party wall contracts, dedicate roads, subdivide, adjust
boundary lines, partition and convey property or give money for equity of
partition;
12.

To operate, either solely or in conjunction with others, any business

operation or enterprise of any nature, whether it be an individual business,
general or limited partnership or corporation, for as long a time and in such a
manner as the Trustees deem proper for the best interests of the Trust, with full

0

power to organize and/or operate as a sole proprietorship or partnership, to
.• t

incorporate such business or to execute or join in any plan of refinancing,
merger, consolidation or reorganization thereof with full power to borrow monies
as the Trustees may deem advisable for the purposes thereof;
13.

To charge to operating expenses all current costs of amortization,

obsolescence and depreciation of any properties of the Trust and to provide
adequate reserves for such amortization, obsolescence and depreciation;
14.

To effect and keep in force life, fire, rent, title, liability or casualty

insurance, or other insurance of any nature, in any form, and in any amount;
15.

To enter into transactions with any other trusts in which the

Trustors or the beneficiaries of this Trust Agreement, or any of them, have
beneficial interests, even though any trustee of such other trust is also a Trustee
under this Trust Agreement;
16.

To exercise all the foregoing powers alone or in conjunction with

others, even though any of the Trustees are personally interested in the property
that is involved, notwithstanding any rules of law relating to divided loyalty or
self-dealing;

0
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17.

To invest in common trust funds, to hold and invest the funds of all

Trusts in solido without a physical division of the assets, as the Trustees in their
discretion may determine.
18.

To consolidate, for the purposes of unified administration only, the

assets of any trust created herein with the assets of any other trust created
herein, to the extent it declares the same to be the best interest of the respective
trust. Furthermore, there need be no physical segregation or division of the
various trusts, except segregation or division may be required by the termination
of any of the trusts, but the Trustee shall keep separate accounts for the different
undivided interests:
19.

To take any action and to make any election, in the Trustee's

discretion, to minimize the tax liabilities of this trust and its beneficiaries and it
shall have the power to allocate the benefits among the various beneficiaries, or
between the income and principal accounts, to compensate for the
consequences of any tax election or any investment or to administrative decision
that the Trustee believes has had the effect of directly or indirectly preferring one
beneficiary or group of beneficiaries over others.
B.

0

Any Trustee may decline to act or may resign as Trustee at any time by

delivering a written resignation to the beneficiaries of a Trust then subsisting.
C.

Any Trustee may, from time to time, delegate to one or more of the

remaining Trustees any powers, duties or discretions. Every such delegation shall be a
writing delivered to the delegate or delegates and shall remain effective for the time
therein specified or until earlier revocation by a further writing similarly delivered.
Everyone dealing with the Trustees shall be absolutely protected in relying upon the
certificate of any Trustee as to whom the Trustees are acting for and as to the extent of
their authority by reason of any delegation or otherwise.
D.

From the income of the Trusts hereby created or, if that be insufficient,

from the principal thereof, the Trustees shall pay and discharge all expenses incurred in
the administration of the Trusts.
E.

No successor Trustee shall be liable for any misfeasance of any prior

Trustee.

F.

The Trustee shall be prohibited from making any payments in

reimbursement to any governmental entity which may have incurred expenses for the
benefit of a beneficiary, and the Trustees shall not pay any obligation of a beneficiary

0
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which obligation is othetwise payable by any governmental entity or pursuant to any
governmental program of reimbursement or payment.

ARTICLE XV
COURT SUPERVISION NOT REQUIRED
All trusts created under this Agreement shall be administered free from the active
supervision of any court.
Any proceedings to seek judicial instructions or a judicial determination shall be
initiated by the Trustee in the appropriate state court having original jurisdiction of those
matters relating to the construction and administration of trusts.

ARTICLE XVI
RENDITION OF ACCOUNTS
A.

During the lifetime of the Trustors, the Trustee shall account only to the

Trustors and their written approval shall be final and conclusive in respect to
transactions disclosed in the account as to all beneficiaries of the trust, including unborn
and contingent beneficiaries. After the death of one of the Trustors, the Trustee shall, in

0

addition to any accounting required under applicable law, render an accounting, from
time to time, but not less frequently than annually, regard«ng the transactions of any
trust created in this instrument. Accountings shall also be rendered by any Trustee
within 30 days after his resignation or removal by a court of competent jurisdiction.
8.

Accountings shall be made by delivering a written accounting to each

beneficiary entitled to current income distributions or, if there are no current income
beneficiaries, to each beneficiary entitled to any current distribution out of income or
principal, and each remainderman in being. If any person entitled to receive an
accounting is a minor or is under a disability, the accounting shall be delivered to his
parents or the guardian of his person if he is a minor or to the guardian or conservator
of his person if he is under any other disability. Unless any beneficiary, including
parents, guardians or conservators of beneficiaries, shall deliver a written objection to
the Trustee within sixty (60) days after receipt of the Trustee's accounting, the account
shall be final and conclusive in respect to transactions disclosed in the accounting as to
all beneficiaries of the trust, including unborn and unascertained beneficiaries. After
settlement of the accounting by agreement of the parties objecting to it, or by expiration
of the sixty (60} day period! the Trustee shall no longer be liable to any beneficiary of

0
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the trust, including unborn and unascertained beneficiaries, in respect to transactions
disclosed in the accounting, except for the Trustee's intentional wrongdoing or fraud.

ARTICLE XVII
CERTIFIED COPIES OF TRUST

To the same effect as if it were the original, any person or institution may rely
upon a copy certified by a Notary Public to be a true copy of this instrument and any
schedules or exhibits attached hereto. Any person or institution may rely upon any
statement of fact certified by anyone who appears from the original Trust, or a certified
copy thereof, to be a Trustee hereunder.

ARTICLE XVIII
DEATH

0

If either of the Trustors has a serious illness or operation, the Trustors request
that the Trustees call J. RANDALL RICHARDS, Attorney at Law, Salt Lake City, Utah,
to obtain instructions in case either of the Trustors should die. If death makes this prior
conversation impossible, then the Trustees should call said attorney as soon as
possible.

ARTICLE XIX
LOCATION OF DOCUMENTS
This Trust has been prepared in duplicate, each copy of which has been
executed as an original. One of these executed copies is in the possession of the
Trustors, and the other is deposited for safekeeping with J. RANDALL RICHARDS,
Attorney at Law, Salt Lake City, Utah. Either copy may be used as an original without
the other and, if only one copy of this Trust Agreement can be found, then it shall be
considered as the original and the missing copy will be presumed inadvertently lost.
Clarifications or instructions concerning this Trust Agreement may be obtained by
calling said law firm.

0
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ARTICLE XX

0

0

PROVISIONS RELATING
TO POLICIES OF INSURANCE

In the event the Trustee is named the beneficiary under any policies of
insurance, said Trustee shall hold the same, subject to order of the owner of the policy,
without obligation other than the safekeeping of any policies which may be delivered to
the Trustee.
The owner of the policy retains all rights, options and privileges with respect to
said policies. Upon receiving possession of insurance policies, proof of death of the
insured, or upon maturity of any policies prior to the death of the insured, the trustee
shall use reasonable efforts to collect all sums payable on such policies for which the
Trust is designated a beneficiary or owner. All insurance settlements as received by the
Trustee shall become principal of the Trust Estate, except interest paid by the insurer,
which shall be classed as income. The Trustee may compromise, arbitrate or otherwise
adjust claims upon any of the policies. The receipt of the Trustee to the insurance
company shall be a full discharge of the company.
The Trustee shall not be responsible for payment of any insurance premiums or
any act or omission of the insured or the owner of the policy. The Trustee shall not be
required to prosecute any
.. action, to collect any insurance or to defend any action
relating to any policy of insurance unless indemnified against costs and expenses,
including attorney's fees.

ARTICLE XXI
DISPOSITION DURING JOINT
LWESOFTHETRUSTORS

During the joint lives of the Trustors, the Trustees shall hold, manage, invest and
reinvest the Trust Estate, and shall collect the income thereof and shall dispose of the
net income and principal as follows:
A.
Income. The Trustees shall pay to the Trustors all of the net income of
this Trust, in monthly or other convenient installments, but at least semi-annually.
B.
Principal. The Trustees may, in their discretion, pay or apply for the
benefit of the Trustors, in addition to the income payments herein provided for, such
amounts of the principal of the Trust Estate, up to the whole thereof, as the Trustees

0
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may from time to time deem necessary or advisable for the use and benefit of the
Trustors.
C.
lncapaci1y. If, in a Trustee's sole and absolute judgment. either of the
Trustors is so incapacitated by reason of illness, age, or other cause that he or she is
incapable of handling funds for his or her own use and benefit, or if unavailable to give
prompt attention to his or her financial affairs, the Trustee may use so much of the net
income and principal of the Trust Estate as the Trustee, in Trustee s sole and absolute
discretion, deems necessary or advisable, (1) for the comfort, support, maintenance,
health and education of said incapacitated Truster and any person who, in the judgment
of the Trustee. is dependent upon said incapacitated Truster, (2) for the payment of
premiums on any insurance policies owned by said incapacitated Truster, whether or
not subject to the terms of this Trust Agreement, and (3) for the purpose of discharging
any debt or obligation incurred by said incapacitated Truster and believed by the
Trustee to be a valid debt including, but not limited to: home rental/mortgage payments,
utilities, installment obligations and established charitable contribution customs.
1

ARTICLE XXII
DISPOSITION AFTER DEATH

0

OF THE FIRST OF THE TRUSTORS

A.

At the death of the first of the Trustors (and in case of simultaneous
deaths, this Trust will operate as if the wife had survived the husband), after payment of
currently due debts, expenses and costs of last illness and funeral out of the decedent1s
Estate, the Trustees shall divide the Trust Estate into three separate Trusts, hereinafter
designated as the "Marital Trust", the "Shelter Trust" and the "Survivor's Trust11 ,
respectively.
B.
The Marital Trust shall consist of a fractional proportion in all property of
the first of the Trustors to die that qualifies for the marital deduction determined as
follows:

1.

The numerator of such fractional proportion of the Trust Estate shall .
be the smallest amount which, if allowed as a marital deduction, would result in
the least possible federal estate tax being payable as a result of the Truster's
death, after allowing for the unified credit against federal estate tax and all
available credits and deductions claimed.
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The numerator shall be reduced by the value of any other property which

0

passes to the Truster's spouse which qualifies for the marital deduction other
than the trust property.
2.

The denominator of this fraction shall be the value of the entire trust

property._ Values assigned to property for purposes of this computation shall be
those values finally determined for federal estate tax purposes. The Trustee
shall have the power to distribute assets, in cash or in kind, to the respective
Trusts and to select specific property to be distributed to the respective Trusts
without regard to the income tax basis of such property. In making these
allocations, the Trustee shall use the value of the assets as of the date or dates
of distribution, so that each distribution shares proportionately in the appreciation
or depreciation of assets between the date of the Trustor's death and the date or
dates of distribution. However, no allocation of assets shall be made to the
Marital Trust which do not qualify for the marital deduction. The Trustee shall
have the power to select specific property to be distributed to the Trusts without
regard to the income tax basis of such property. To the extent that other assets
which qualify for the marital deduction are available, there shall not be allocated
.t

0

to the Marital Trust: {a) assets with respect to which an estate tax credit for
foreign taxes paid is allowable; (b) United States Treasury Bonds that are eligible
for redemption at par value in payment of the federal estate tax. In computing
the marital deduction, all generation-skipping transfers for which the Truster is
the "deemed transferor11 shall be disregarded.
C.

The Marital Trust shall be held by the Trustees separately in trust for the

following purposes:
1.

The Trustee shall collect the income on said Trust and pay or apply

for the surviving spouse the net income thereof, in quarterly or other convenient
installments (but at least annually}, for and during the term of said surviving
spouse's life.
2.

Any remaining trust corpus shall be added at the death of the

surviving spouse to the Shelter Trust and shall be held and administered as a
part thereof; provided, however, that the Trustees shall first pay from the Marital
Trust the last illness and funeral expenses and any death taxes of the survivor of
the Trustors.
D.

The Survivor's Trust shall consist of the property which is the exclusive

ownership of the surviving spouse, such as said surviving spouse's interest in all

0
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community property and separate property belonging to said survivor or said survivors

0

Trust. Said Trust Estate is under the full control of the surviving Trustor and, if not
appointed otherwise, shall, upon the death of the surviving spouse, be distributed
pursuant to the provisions of the Shelter Trust.
E.

The Shelter Trust shall contain the balance of the Trust Estate remaining

after setting aside all property of the Trust Estate that is included in the Marital Trust
and Survivor's Trust. The Shelter Trust shall be subject to the payment of all the death
taxes of the first of the Trustors to die and shall be held by the Trustees separately in
trust for the following purposes:
1.

The Trustees may distribute the income of the Shelter Trust among

the issue of both of the Trustors as the survivor of the Trustors may appoint.
2.

During the lifetime of the surviving Truster, the Trustees of the

Shelter Trust may distribute to said survivor such part or all of the net
unappointed income and principal of the Shelter Trust as said Trustee, in his sole
discretion, determines necessary or appropriate for the support and maintenance
of said survivor in the standard of living to which the surviving Truster is
accustomed, including reasonably adequate health, medical, dental, hospital,
nursing and invalidism expenses. The powers herein granted to the surviving

0

Truster, while serving as a Trustee or Co-Trustee of this Trost Agreement, shall
be limited as follows: The surviving Trustor shall have no right to determine the
amount of any income or principal of the Shelter Trust to be retained or to be
distributed to said survivor or to distribute such but such determination and
distribution shall be made by the Trustee or Trustees serving with the surviving
Truster. If such survivor is serving as sole Trustee of this Trust Agreement, then
said determination and distribution shall be made by the successor Trustee or
Trustees named immediately after the Trustors in this Trust Agreement.
3.

The surviving Trustor shall have the unrestricted power at any time

to invade the principal of the Shelter Trust (nonmarital trust) annually, to the
extent of the greater of the following amounts: a) the sum of $5,000 orb) 5% of
the fair market value of the property of the Shelter Trust determined by the
Trustee as of the end of the month immediately preceding the request. This
power shall be noncumulative and the power with respect to each year shall, if
not exercised, lapse on the last day of each calendar year the power is held. The
exercising of this power shall be made in writing by said surviving Truster to the
Trustee.

0
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4.

0

Upon the death of the surviving Truster, the Trustees shall dispose

of the unappointed remaining principal and income of the Shelter Trust as
directed in Article XXIII.
F.

Statutory interests, if any, of the survivor of the Trustors, in his or her

spouse's real and personal property, is hereby expressly waived by both of the Trustors.
G.

If this Trust is named beneficiary under any retirement plan, then such

amounts so received shall be held pursuant to the provisions of Article XXII, paragraph
E, provided further, that no federal estate nor state inheritance taxes nor any debts or
liabilities of the deceased Truster/plan participant may be paid from such proceeds.
H.

If the Trustors or any primary and secondary beneficiary die

simultaneously or under such conditions that it cannot be determined from credible
evidence which of them was the first to die, the provisions made herein for the surviving
spouse shall be construed as though the Truster-wife survived the Truster-husband.
Any secondary beneficiary shall be deemed to have predeceased the primary
beneficiary.

ARTICLE XXIII
DISPOSITION ON DEATH OF

0

THE SURVIVING TRUSTOR
All Trust principal, with all accumulated income thereof, directed to be disposed
of under the provisions herein, shall, upon the death of the survivor of the Trustors, be
held in Trust for the benefit of the following beneficiaries of the Trustors and shall be
disposed of as follows:
A.

An amount determined by the Trustees, in their sole discretion, shall be

set aside from the balance of the funds held in Trust and shall be used for the support,
maintenance, health insurance or to meet the costs of any illness or accident and
education of the beneficiaries of this Trust as determined by Article XXIII, paragraph C 1
who have not reached age 21 prior to the death of the survivor of the Trustors.
Education of the beneficiaries shall include, but not be limited to, musical education,
dancing lessons, grammar school, secondary school, college, graduate school, trade
school, private school and vocational training school.
In determining the amount to be set aside under the provisions of this paragraph
and the amounts to be paid therefrom, the Trustees shall take into account the needs,
ages, assets and other available sources of income and support of the beneficiaries,

0

including each beneficiary1s ability to contribute to his or her own support. The Trustees
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shall determine the amounts to be distributed, the beneficiary or beneficiaries to whom

0

distributions are to be made, and the time and manner of distributions made under this
paragraph and shall distribute according to the various needs of the beneficiaries, even
if such distributions are unequal. After the youngest beneficiary described in paragraph
B herein has attained age 21, the balance, if any, of the amounts set aside under this
paragraph shall be distributed according to Article XXIJI, paragraph C.
B.

In the event Rachel Ann Smith is under 18 years of age, the Trustees shall

set aside in Trust, the real property last used as the·principal residence of the Trustors,
for the benefit of Rachel until such time as she attains 18 years of age. The Trustees
shall also set aside a sufficient amount of money to pay all expenses related to the
upkeep of the principal residence. When Rachel turns 18, the Trustees shall distribute
11

the principal residence according to the provisions set forth in paragraph "C below.
C.

After setting aside sufficient amounts to carry out the purposes of Article

XXIII, paragraph A, above, the Trustees shall divide the Trust Estate into as many equal
shares as there are children of the Trustors then living and children of the Trustors then
deceased but leaving surviving issue; provided further, that each of said shares, if not
immediately distributed, shall constitute and be held, administered and distributed by
the Trustees as a separate Trust, as follows:

0

1.

One such share shall be set aside for the benefit of each of the

children of the Trustors who may then be living and, if held in Trust, shall
constitute the Trust Estate of such child's Trust.
2.

One such equal share of the Trust Estate shall be set aside for the

benefit of the surviving issue, by right of representation, of each of the children of
the Trustors who may then be deceased but leave issue surviving and, if held in
Trust, shall constitute the Trust Estate of such issue's Trust; the amounts so set
aside may be used for the purposes and benefits as enumerated in Article XXI 11,
paragraph A, above.
3.

As each above-described beneficiary attains age 21, the share of

the Trust Estate for said beneficiary shall be distributed to him or her free and
clear of Trust, upon his or her request therefore, as follows: 1/3 of the Trust
Estate shall be distributed to each beneficiary when he or she has attained the
age of 21; 1/2 of the remaining balance of the Trust Estate shall be distributed to
each beneficiary when he or she has attained the age of 25; and the remaining
balance shall be distributed to each beneficiary upon attaining age 30.

0
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D.
Whenever used herein. the terms 11 issue11 , "child", "children" and
"descendants" include adopted issue, adopted child, adopted children and adopted
descendants, as well as natural issue, natural child, natural children and natural
descendants, and include descendants of adopted issue. adopted child, adopted
children and adopted descendants.
E. · If any of the above beneficiaries are unable or unwilling to take any portion
of the Trust Estate, then the Trustees shall distribute the portion of the property of that
beneficiary to his or her issue by right of representation and, if none, then to the other
Trust beneficiaries proportionate to each beneficiary's interest in the Trust and, if no
remaining beneficiaries, then: one-half to the living heirs at law of the first of the
Trustors to die and one-half to the living heirs at law of the last. of the Trustors to die;
provided further, that said heirs at law of each of the Trustors shall take the Trust
property in the same priority and in the same distributive order as listed in the law of
intestate succession of the state referred to in Article I as in force on the date of the
signing of this Trust Agreement.

ARTICLE XXIV
ADMINISTRATION OF TRUST UPON THE DEATH OF A TRUSTOR

0

A.
On the death of a Truster, the Trustee is authorized, but not directecf to
pay the following:
1.
Expenses of the last illness, funeral and burial of such Trustor.
2.
Legally enforceable claims against such Truster or such of Trustor's
estate.
3.
Expenses with regard to the administration of such Truster's estate.
4.
Federal estate tax, applicable state inheritance or estate taxes. or
any other taxes occasioned by the death of such Truster.
5.
Statutory or court ordered allowances for qualifying family
members.
6.
The payments authorized under this Article are discretionary, and
no claims or right to payment by third parties may be enforced against the trust
by virtue of such discretionary authority.
7.
The Trustee shall be indemnified from the trust property for any
damages sustained by the Trustee as a result of the Trustee exercising, in good
faith, the authority granted the Trustee under this Article.
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8.

0

If the Trust created herein holds United States Treasury Bonds which are

eligible for redemption at par in payment of the federal estate tax, the Trustee shall
redeem such bonds to the extent necessary to pay federal estate tax as a result of such
Truster's death.
C.

This paragraph shall be utilized to help facilitate the coordination between

the personal representative of a Truster's probate estate and the Trustee with respect to
any property owned by the Trustors outside of this Trust Agreement on such Truster's
death.
1.

The Trustee, in the Trustee's sole and absolute discretion, may

elect to pay the payments authorized under this Article either directly to the
appropriate persons or institutions or to the personal representative of such
Truster's probate estate.
The Trustee may rely upon the written statements of such Truster's
personal representative as to all material facts relating to these payments; the
Trustee shall not have any duty to see to the application of such payments.
2.

The Trustee is authorized to purchase and retain in the form

received, as an addition to the Trust, any property which is a part of such
Truster's probate estate. In addition, the Trustee may make loans, with or

0

.. t

without security, to such Truster's probate estate. The Trustee shall not be liable
for any loss suffered by any Trust created herein as a result of the exercise of the
powers granted in this paragraph.
3.

The Trustee is authorized to accept distributions from the personal

representative of an Truster's probate estate without audit and the Trustee shall
be under no obligation to examine the records or accounts of the personal
representative of such Truster's probate estate.

ARTICLEXXV
TRUSTEE'S AUTHORITY TO MAKE TAX ELECTIONS

The Trustee may exercise any available elections with regard to state or federal
income, inheritance, estate, succession, or gift tax law.
A.

Alternate Valuation Date. The authority granted the Trustee in this Article

includes the right to elect any alternate valuation date for federal estate, state estate or
inheritance tax purposes.
B.

0

Tax and Returns. The Trustee may also:
1.

Sign joint tax returns.
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C.

2.

Pay any taxes, interest or penalties with regard to taxes.

3.

Apply for and collect tax refunds and interest thereon.

All expenses, taxes and claims shall be paid without apportionment, and

without reimbursement from any person.

ARTICLE XXVI
PERSONAL PROPERTY DISTRIBUTIONS

All personal properties listed on the Personal Property List are to be distributed to
the named designees and such items shall be conveyed to such persons in addition to
their respective distributive shares of the Trust described herein.

ARTICLE XXVII
TRUSTEES AND FAMILY MEMBERS

A.

0

B.

The present living children of the Trustors and their birth dates are:
Keith Lance Smith, Jr.

September 18, 1980

Loren James Smith

November 8, 1985

Sarah Lynn Smith Goodwin

April 21, 1988

Rachel Ann Smith

April 6, 1993

The following people shall seiv~ as·'frustees:
1.

Keith L. Smith and Sharon L. Smith, Trustors, as Co-Trustees of
The Smith Family Trust.

2.

Keith L. Smith, Granter, as Trustee of The Keith L. Smith Trust.

3.

Sharon L. Smith, Granter, as Trustee of The Sharon L. Smith Trust.

4.

When a Granter is unable or unwilling to serve as Trustee, the
remaining Granter shall seive as Trustee.

5.

When neither Granter is able or willing to seive as Trustee, the
following persons are appointed as Trustees in the following order
of succession:
a.

K. Lance Smith.

b.

Matthew Swenson.

c.

A Trustee chosen by a majority of beneficiaries, with a
parent or legal guardian voting for minor beneficiaries.

C.

Whenever more than one Trustee is designated to act concurrently, a

majority of the Trustees, whether individual or corporate, shall have the power to make
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0

any decision, undertake any action, or execute any documents affecting the Trusts
created herein. In the event of a difference of opinion among the Trustees, the decision
of a majority of them shall prevail, but the dissenting or nonassenting Trustees shall not
be responsible for any action taken by the majority pursuant to ~uch decision. After the
death of the first of the Trustors to die, if only two individual Trustees are in office, they
must act unanimously. If an individual and a corporate Trustee are in office, the
determination of the individual Trustee shall be binding.
D.
Each Successor Trustee shall have the same duties and powers as are
assumed in this Trust Agreement.
E.
No successor Trustee shall be liable for any act, omission, or default of a
predecessor Trustee. Unless requested in writing within sixty (60) days of appointment
by an adult beneficiary of the trust, no successor Trustee shall have any duty to
investigate or review any action of a predecessor Trustee and may accept the
accounting records of the predecessor Trustee showing assets on hand without further
investigation and without incurring any liability to any person claiming or having an
interest in the trust.

ARTICLE XXVIII

0

c~

SPECIAL TRUSTEE PROVISIONS

As used throughout this Agreement, the word Trustee shall refer to the
A.
original Trustee as well as any single, additional, or successor Trustee. It shall also
refer to any individual, corporation or other entity acting as a replacement, substitute, or
added Trustee.
B.
After the death of the first of the Trustors, the surviving Truster shall have
the right, from time-to-time, to discharge any Trustee or Successor Trustee of any trust
hereunder and to appoint a successor as Trustee in its place. Upon the death of the
surviving Trustor1 the unanimous consent of the then Beneficiaries of all Trusts then
established shall be sufficient to discharge any Trustee or Co-Trustee and appoint a
successor Trustee or Co-Trustee. Discharge of a Trustee shall be by delivering to such
Trustee thirty (30) days notice of discharge accompanied by the name of the intended
Successor Trustee. The Trustee of any trust hereunder, including any Successor
Trustee, may resign by delivery of ninety (90) days' written notice of resignation to all of
the then income beneficiaries of such trust. In the event of such resignation, such
income beneficiaries who are adults shall have the right to appoint a Successor Trustee
in its place; provided, that if no such income beneficiary is an adult, then such
21
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appointment shall be made by the parent or legal guardian of such income beneficiary;

0

provided further, that in the event of dispute among such income beneficiaries, their
parents or their guardians,, the majority shall prevail.
C.

As long as any individual named in this instrument shall serve as Co-

Trustee of these trusts, that individual shall have the power from time-to-time to
delegate to the other Co-Trustee all or any of his powers as Co-Trustee during
temporary vacation periods or other temporary periods. The power of delegation shall
be exercised by delivery by the individual Co-Trustee to the other Co-Trustee of written
notice specifying the powers delegated; this delegation shall terminate on delivery by
the individual Co-Trustee to the other Co-Trustee of written notice of termination of
delegation. The individual Co-Trustee shall incur no liability to any beneficiary of the
Trust Estate as a result of any action taken or not taken within the scope of delegation
during the period of delegation.
D.

The Original Trustee or Co-Trustees shall receive no compensation for

ordinary services performed hereunder. The Successor Trustee or Trustees, whether
corporate or noncorporate, shall be entitled to receive reasonable compensation for
seivices rendered by them or counsel retained by them, including services in
connection with the transfer of assets to beneficiaries or successor Trustees and the

0

appointment"of sllCcessor Trustees. Reasonable compensation shall be based upon
the then prevailing rates charged for similar services in the locality where the same are
performed by other fiduciaries engaged in the trust business or acting as Trustees.
E.

The Trustee may abandon any real or personal property which may be

determined to be worthless; any such determination by the Trustee shall be binding
upon all parties interested hereunder.
F.

If an individual Co-Trustee is unable to participate in trust activities

because of illness, disability, or any other reason, the remaining Trustee may, during
any such incapacity, make any and all decisions regarding the Trust Estate as though it
were the sole Trustee. In determining the disability of the individual Trustee, the
remaining Trustee may rely on a certificate or other written statement from two licensed
physicians who have examined the individu·a1 Trustee. In the absence of such a
certificate or statement, the remaining Trustee shall petition the court having jurisdiction
over this trust for authority to proceed as sole Trustee; under authority of this paragraph.
The remaining Trustee shall incur no liability to any beneficiary of the trust or to the
individual Trustee as a result of any action taken under this paragraph.

0
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G.
This trust is created upon the express understanding that the issuer
(including transfer agents) or custodian of any shares of stock or mutual funds shall be
under no liability whatsoever to see to its proper administration; and that upon the
transfer of the right, title and interest in and to said shares by any Trustee hereunder,
said issuer or custodian shall conclusively treat the transferee as the sole owner of said
shares. In the event that any shares, cash, or other property shall be distributable at
any time under the terms of said shares, the said issuer or custodian is fully authorized
to pay, deliver and distribute the same to whosoever shall then be Trustee hereunder,
and shall be under no liability to see the proper application thereof. The issuer or
custodian is authorized to make such distributions under a mutual fund systematic
withdrawal plan as have been specified by any Trustee acting hereunder. Until the
issuer or custodian shall receive from some person interested in this trust written notice
of any death or other event upon with the right to receive may depend, the issuer or
custodian shall incur no liability for payments made in good faith to persons whose
interests shall have been affected by such event. The issuer or custodian shall be
protected in acting upon any notice or other instrument or document believed by it to be
genuine and to have been signed or presented by the property party or parties. The
Trustee shall have the right to pledge the shares as collateral for any loans made to the
trust or to any Trustors.
H.
During the lifetime of the Trustors, they shall have the power in their
discretion, to direct that the Trustee employ a reputable professional investment counsel
of their choice, provided that the investment counsel shall currently be handling at least
five other accounts of similar size. Any investment counsel designated by the Tru·stors
or either of them shall continue to be retained in that capacity after the death of the
survivor of the Trustors. In the absence of compelling circumstances to the contrary or
except as provided below. On the death or legal disability of the surviving Truster, each
child of the Trustors who has attained the age of 25 shall have the power, in his
discretion, to direct that the Trustee employ a reputable professional _investment counsel
of his choice (provided that the investment counsel shall currently be handling at least
five other accounts of similar size) to supervise the investment of the trust set aside for
that child and his issue.
The Trustee shall abide by the decision of the independent counsel with
respect to property placed under his control, but shall not be held liable or otherwise
surcharged for losses directly attributable to investments made on the advice of the
independent counsel. During the period that independent counsel is retained by the
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Trustee, the Trustee shall not be required to conduct reviews of estate or trust
investments subject to the supervision of the investment counsel, and it shall be
required to take no action in respect to those estate or trust investments unless it shall
receive written instructions from the investment counsel.
In the event investment counsel is obtained, the Trustee's fees for its
ordinary services in respect to property subject to supervision of the investment counsel
for the period the counsel is retained, shall be reduced a reasonable amount to take
account of the absence of investment responsibility in respect to that property.

ARTICLE XXIX
NO CONTEST PROVISION

,.t

@

0

Trustors specifically desire that the trusts created by this document shall be
administered and distributed without litigation or dispute of any kind. If any beneficiary
of this trust, or any other person, shall seek to establish or asse,rt any claim to the Trust
Estate established herein, other than as provided in this document, or to attack, oppose,
or seek to set aside the administration and distribution of the Trust Estate other than as
herein set forth, then and in such event, such person or persons who shall initiate such
action shall receive from the Trustees the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) and no more in lieu
of any interest in the Trust Estate.

ARTICLEXXX
S CORPORATION STOCK

A.

In the event any Trust created under this Trust Agreement owns stock in
one (1} or more S Corporations as defined under Section 1361 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 (or any successor Act provision), as amended or supplemented, the
following shall apply. Such Trust shall be divided into two {2) parts, held as separate
shares. One {1) part shall consist of all assets allocated to such Trust except stock in
any S Corporations. This part shall be held and administered in accordance with the
provisions of the Article creating the Trust. The balance of the assets, composed of
only S Corporation stock, shall be maintained as separate equal shares for each of the
primary beneficiaries, each of which such separate shares will constitute a Qualified
Subchapter S Trust for the benefit of the said primary beneficiary as provided in the
Article of this Trust Agreement creating such Trust. For purposes of this Article, the
term primary beneficiary shall mean the individual currently entitled to receive income

0
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and/or principal from the Trust (but shall not include dependents of such person unless

0

specifically named as a beneficiary of such Trust). Except for this provision establishing
the separate Qualified Subchapter S Trust hereunder, all other provisions of the Article
establishing such Trust shall be applicable, except to the extent that the following
specific requirements shall be applicable to such Trust. It is the Trustors' intention that
each such separate share holding the S Corporation stock shall constitute a Qualified
Subchapter S Trust, as defined in Internal Revenue Code Section 1361 (d)(3), as
amended or supplemented, and as such, the following specific requirements shall be
applicable to each of such separate shares:
1.

All income of each such separate share shall be distributed to the

primary beneficiary who shall be the income beneficiary of such separate share.
2.

During the life of the current income beneficiary, the.re shall be only

one {1) income beneficiary of each such separate share.
3.

The current income beneficiary of each such separate share shall

be a citizen or resident of the United States.
4.

Any corpus distributed during the life of the current income

beneficiary may be distributed only to such beneficiary.
5.

0

The income interest of the current income beneficiary in the

separate share shall terminate on the earlier of ·sucfi beneficiary's death or the
termination of the Trust.
6.

Upon the termination of the Trust during the life of the current

income beneficiary, the Trust shall distribute all of the assets held as a separate
share to such beneficiary.
B.

The provisions of this Article shall apply regardless of whether the election

to be taxed as an S Corporation was made prior or subsequent to the Truster's death.

ARTICLE XXXI
GUARDIAN'S EXPENDITURES
The Trustors do not desire, after their death, that the guardian of any minor
beneficiary should incur personal expense in the support and maintenance of such
beneficiary. The Trustee is authorized to disburse funds from such beneficiary's Trust
Estate for the purpose of reimbursing such guardian for reasonable expenses incurred
in supporting and caring for such minor beneficiary.
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ARTICLE XXXII

()

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

A.

Use of principal residence. On the death of the first of the Trustors, the

surviving Trustor shall have the right to continue to occupy and use the home, that the
surviving Trustor and the deceased Trustor were using as a principal residence (if it is
part of the Trust Estate), provided, however, that the surviving Trustor, in his or her
discretion, may direct the Trustees to sell any such property and replace it with or rent
or lease another residence selected by the survivor of the Trustors of comparable or
lower value. The surviving Truster shall not be required to pay any rent for the use of
said residence.
B.

Simultaneous Death. If there is not sufficient evidence that the Trustors

died otherwise than simultaneously, then for purposes fo this Trust Agreement it shall
be conclusively presumed for all purposes of administration and tax effect of this Trust
that the Decedent shall be the Husband and the Survivor shall be the Wife.
C.
Limitations of Trust Powers. Administration control and all other powers

0

relating to the various Trust Estates created hereunder, shall be exercised by the
Trustee in a fiduciary capacity and solely for the benefit of the survivor and the issue of
the Trustors. Neither the Trustee, the Trustors, nor any other person, shall be permitted
to purchase, exchange, reacquire or otherwise deal with or dispose of the principal of
any of the various Trust Estates or the income therefrom, for less than an adequate
interest in any case or without adequate security therefor. Any person holding a
fiduciary power hereunder may release or reduce the scope of his power or may
disclaim any part or all of such power.
D.
Headings. Clause headings are not part of this Trust Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Trustors have executed this Trust Agreement
on the _42.__ day of September, 2006, as Trustors and Trustees:

SHARON L. SMITH

0
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STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this~ day of

September, 2006, by Keith L. Smith and Sharon L. Smith.

My commission expires:

.t
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SCHEDULE "A"

KEITH L. SMITH and SHARON L. SMITH, Granters, do hereby sell, transfer,
convey, quitclaim and assign for Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable
consideration, all rights, title and interests in the property set forth below to the Granters
as Trustees of THE SMITH FAMILY TRUST, dated t h e £ day of September, 2006,
Grantee. In addition, property listed under the ownership category as KLS is the
exclusive property of THE KEITH L. SMITH TRUST, property listed as SLS is the
exclusive property of THE SHARON L. SMITH TRUST, and property designated KLS &
SLS is owned equally by the two Trusts.

1.

All present and future interest of the Undersigned in the following real

estate, together with all present and future improvements thereon, and all present and

0

future water and water rights thereunto belonging and also including all pre"sent and all
future personal property located thereon or wheresoever located:
Ownership
SLS

A.

Lot 12, Castagna Acres Subdivision, as described in the plat maps
and records on file at the County Recorder's Office, Tooele County,
State of Utah.
Tax Parcel No.: 08-023-0-0011
COUNTY OF TOOELE, STATE OF UTAH
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2.

(~

The following accounts in the following institutions, together with all future

additions, interest or accumulations therein and also including all new accounts and the

\__.,'

accumulations and the future additions, interest or accumulation in any and all other
financial institutions in which new accounts are opened in the future:
Ownership
KLS & SLS

A.

Tooele Federal Credit Union

Account No. 59643
Prime Share
Premier Money Market
Budget Shares
Choice Plus Checking

3.

Vehicles:

Ownership
KLS & SLS

A.

2002 Chevrolet
Vehicle Identification No.: 2G1WF55K429192721
Utah Title No.: UT3900266

-0
KLS & SLS

B.

1990 Chevrolet
Vehicle Identification No.: 1GBEG25K0L7161875
Utah Title No.: UT1370813

4.
SLS

All right. title and interest in and to the following:

A.

All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family
Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership.

Dated the Jg_ day of September, 2006.

('.
\_J
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STATE OF UTAH

0

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this~ day of
September, 2006, by Keith L. Smith and Sharon L. Smith.

My commission expires:

0
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SCHEDULE "A"

KEITH L. SMITH and SHARON L. SMITH, Granters, do hereby sell, transfer,
convey, quitclaim and assign for Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable
consideration, all rights, title and interests in the property set forth below to the Grantors
as Trustees of THE SMITH FAMILY TRUST, dated t h e ~ day of September, 2006,
Grantee. In addition, property listed under the ownership category as KLS is the
exclusive property of THE KEITH L. SMITH TRUST, property listed as SLS is the
exclusive property of THE SHARON L. SMITH TRUST, and property designated KLS &
SLS is owned equally by the two Trusts.
1.

All present and future interest of the Undersigned in the following real

estate, together with all present and future improvements thereon, and all present and

()

future wafer and water rights thereunto belonging and also including all present and all
future personal property located thereon or wheresoever located:
Ownership
SLS

A.

Lot 12, Castagna Acres Subdivision, as described in the plat maps
and records on file at the County Recorder's Office, Tooele County,
State of Utah.
Tax Parcel No.: 08-023-0-0011
COUNTY OF TOOELE, STATE OF UTAH
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2.
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The following accounts in the following institutions. together with all future

additions, interest or accumulations therein and also including all new accounts and the

'

accumulations and the future additions, interest or accumulation in any and all other
financial institutions in which new accounts are opened in the future:
Ownership
KLS & SLS A.

Tooele Federal Credit Union

Account No. 59643
Prime Share
Premier Money Market
Budget Shares
Choice Plus Checking

3.

Vehicles:

Ownership
KLS & SLS A.

2002 Chevrolet
Vehicle Identification No.: 2G1WF55K429192721
Utah Title No.: UT3900266

0
KLS& SLS

8.

.,

1990 Chevrolet
Vehicle Identification No.: 1GBEG25K0L7161875
Utah Title No.: UT1370813

4.
SLS

All right, title and interest in and to the following:

A.

All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family
Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership.

Dated the Jg_ day of September, 2006.

{',

\J
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STATE OF UTAH

0

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this~ day of
September, 2006, by Keith L. Smith and Sharon L. Smith.

My commission expires:

0
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JAIME TOPHAM (11782)
LAW OFFICE OF JAIME TOPHAM, PLLC
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
291 NORTH RACE STREET
GRANTSVILLE, UT 84029
TELEPHONE: (435) 884-3426

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

SHARON SMITH
Petitioner,
VS.

Case No. 134300466
KEITH SMITH
Respondent.

Commissioner Michele Tack
Judge Robert W. Adkins

The parties came before the Honorable Judge Robert W. Adkins on
.t

February 12, 2015 for trial on the issues concerning the parties' divorce action.
Sharon Smith was present with her attorney, Jaime Topham. Keith Smith was
present with his attorney Michael D. Black.
The Court heard testimony, received exhibits, heard argument, and having found
proper grounds and jurisdiction, and being fully advised in the premises, does hereby
enter the following:

FINDINGS OF

FACT

1. The parties have been actual and bona fide residents of Tooele County, Utah for at
least three months immediately prior to the filing of this divorce action.
2. The parties were married on December 15, 1979, in Maricopa County, Arizona, are
husband and wife and maintained their marital domicile in Tooele County, Utah.
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3. There are irreconcilable differences existing as to both parties and both parties are
entitled to a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable difference.
PERSONAL PROPERTY
1. The court understands that both parties have emotional
attachments to items of their son, Jarom, but the court will

~

leave the assets where they are presently. The painting will
remain with Petitioner and the chest will remain with
Respondent.
2. The remaining personal property is awarded to each party, as
they now possess it.

.,

w

REAL PROPERTY

3. During the marriage the parties purchased a home together
located at 203 Quirk Street, Grantsville, Utah, 84029.
~

4. The Court finds that the home was transferred to the Smith
Family Trust to protect the home from the Respondent's
potential liabilities. Respondent had been engaged in a
business which entailed a higher than normal degree of risk.
So the Court finds that the house was transferred to protect it
from potential liabilities, but that the house remained a marital
asset.
5. The house should be sold and the proceeds.of the sale should

March 26, 2015 06:36 PM
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be divided as follows:
a. First, the mortgage and the costs of the sale to include realtor and title company
costs should be paid before dividing any proceeds;
b. The remaining proceeds will be divided equally between the parties with the
following caveats:
i.

The court is ordering that because the Respondent didn't pay the $200.00
per month under the Temporary Order, entered by the Court on
December 5, 2015, that there will be deducted from his share of the
equity $200.00 per month starting September, 2014 and ending February
2015, for a total of $1,200.00; and
.• r

ii.

Petitioner paid the full cost of the parties' two mediation
sessions in the amount of $1,125.00. The Respondent
shall pay half of the mediation expenses, in the amount of
$562.50, which will be deducted from his share of the
equity.

iii.

Petitioner shall be awarded the amounts deducted from
Respondent's share of the equity as stated above.

6. The Respondent may continue to live in the home until it is
sold. If he chooses to remain in the home, Respondent should
continue to pay $200.00 a month toward the mortgage as well
as all utilities associated with the home while living there.
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Respondent should pay the $200.00 to Petitioner each month.
The Respondent should take good care of the home and

(i)

should keep it in condition where it can be shown and in a
condition that is acceptable to the realtor that is selected by
the parties.

~

7. The parties should mutually agree upon the realtor selected to
sell the home and each should cooperate to get the home sold
so that the equity can be taken out of the home and divided as

~

ordered in paragraph 8(b).
8. If there is a problem that develops and the realtor is of the

.,

•

opinion that the home is not being sold because it is being
lived it, the parties can address the issue with the Court by
providing the Court with the information from the realtor.

~

9. Petitioner's request for $5,328.00 in mortgage payments that

she paid while Respondent was residing in the home will not
be granted. Respondent will be responsible for the $200.00 a
~

month to be paid toward the monthly mortgage payment as
previously ordered in paragraph B(b)(i), but no further
recoupment will be ordered.

~

INHERITANCE
10. As to the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, the
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Court believes that the Partnership was an inheritance. The
way the Court views it is that the Petitioner's mother helped
the parties. The Court believes that the help was appropriate,
that there was a need there, and that Petitioner's mother
addressed that need.
11. The court finds that all of the monies the came from the
partnership and distributions out of the partnership, not
including gifts from the mother that came from her personal
assets, were the Petitioner's inheritance.
12. In trying to reconcile Exhibit (Schedule) A to the Smith Family
.• t

Trust, the Court looked at number 4 on Exhibit (Schedule) A,
which states "All right, title and interest in and to the following:
All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family
Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership."
13. The court believes that all interest of Sharon L. Smith in the
Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership included
distributions and they were simply part of the partnership.
14. The Court is interpreting number 4 of Exhibit (Schedule) A to
mean all the distributions belong to Petitioner.
15. The court believes the language of number 2 of Exhibit
(Schedule A) was for other assets but did not include interest
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in the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership.
16. The Court finds that in order to pay family expenses, Petitioner
used some proceeds until 2012 when the large amount came
in. She used those for the family to survive. The court finds
those amounts were comingled, but that she did not comingle
the larger payment of $750,000.00 that was distributed from
the partnership, and that remains as the Petitioner's sole and
separate property.
17. Petitioner is entitled to funds in the Zions and LPL (formerly
Edward Jones) account and the accounts are the sole

.••

property of the Petitioner.

~

ALIMONY
18. The court understands the Respondent has medical
circumstances and that he receives Social Security Disability
in the amount of $1,198.00 per month as a result of those
circumstances.
19. The Court finds that the Respondent has unmet needs.
20. The Court finds that the Court, in this case, should look at
separate property of the Petitioner in looking at the unmet
needs of Respondent.
21. The Court, in calculating Respondent's unmet needs, finds
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that Respondent's declaration has overstated his needs, and
therefore sets his needs at $1,700.00 per month.
22. The Court finds that Respondent's income is $1,198.00 per
month and that his unmet expenses are $1,700.00 per month
leaving a need for alimony in the amount of $502.00 per
month.
23. The court finds that Petitioner should pay alimony to
Respondent in the amount of $502.00 per month, not to
exceed the length of the marriage. Alimony should terminate
upon death, marriage, or cohabitation by the Respondent.
.t

ATTORNEY FEES

24. Each party should pay their own attorney fees and costs
incurred in this action.
~

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court as set forth above.
~

2. The parties should be granted a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable
differences.
3. That the personal property should be awarded as set forth above.
4. That the real property should be distributed as set forth above.
5. That Petitioner's interest in the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership is her
separate inheritance.
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6. That the Zions account and the LPL account should be awarded as set forth
above.

7. That Respondent has an unmet need for alimony and that alimony should be
awarded as set forth above.
8. That attorney fees should be discharged as set forth above.
Approved as to Form and Content:
/s/ Michael D. Black
Electronically signed by Jaime Topham with permission of Michael D. Black
Attorney for Respondent

END OF ORDER

··' No. 4,
In accordance with the Utah State District Court's Efiling Standard
and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 10(e), this Order does not bear the
handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an electronic
signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this Order.
*********H********H***H*H****
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The Order of Court is stated below:
/1,.:-~-.:~\ ·i
Dated: March 26, 201 S
Isl RoberiW~J · J;
06:36:54 PM

Districk:~~}·

~~;~1.]JJt?l'

JAIME TOPHAM (11782)
LAW OFFICE OF JAIME TOPHAM, PLLC
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
291 NORTH RACE STREET
GRANTSVILLE, UT 84029
TELEPHONE: (435) 884-3426
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

SHARON SMITH
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 134300466

KEITH SMITH
Respondent.

Commissioner Michele Tack
Judge Robert W. Adkins

DECREE OF DIVORCE

The parties came before the Honorable Judge Robert W. Adkins on
.. t

February 12, 2015 for trial on the issues concerning the parties' divorce action.
Sharon Smith was present with her attorney, Jaime Topham. Keith Smith was
present with his attorney Michael D. Black.
The Court heard testimony, received exhibits, heard argument, and having
found proper grounds and jurisdiction, and being fully advised in the premises, and
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby:
ORDERED,ADJUDGED,andDECREED

1. The parties are mutually granted a divorce a divorce from one another on the
grounds of irreconcilable differences, such to become final upon signature and
entry herein.
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PERSONAL PROPERTY
1. The court understands that both parties have emotional
attachments to items of their son, Jarom, but the court will
leave the assets where they are presently. The painting shall
remain with Petitioner and the chest shall remain with
Respondent
2. The remaining personal property is awarded to each party, as
~

they now possess it.

REAL PROPERTY
3. During the marriage the parties purchased a home together
.t

~

located at 203 Quirk Street, Grantsville, Utah, 84029.

4. The house shall be sold and the proceeds of the sale shall be
divided as follows:
a. First, the mortgage and the costs of the sale to include realtor and title company
costs shall be paid before dividing any proceeds;
b. The remaining proceeds shall be divided equally between the parties with the
following caveats:
i.

The court is ordering that because the Respondent didn't pay the $200.00
per month under the Temporary Order, entered by the Court on
December 5, 2015, that there shall be deducted from his share of the
equity $200.00 per month starting September, 2014 and ending February
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2015, for a total of $1,200.00; and
ii.

Petitioner paid the full cost of the parties' two mediation

~

sessions in the amount of $1, 125.00. The Respondent
shall pay half of the mediation expenses, in the amount of
$562.50, which shall be deducted from his share of the

~

equity.
iii.

Petitioner shall be awarded the amounts deducted from
Respondent's share of the equity as stated above.

5. The Respondent may continue to live in the home until it is
sold. If he chooses to remain in the home, Respondent shall
,r

~

continue to pay $200.00 a month toward the mortgage as well
as all utilities associated with the home while living there.
Respondent shall pay the $200.00 to Petitioner each month.

4±1

The Respondent shall take good care of the home and shall
keep it in condition where it can be shown and in a condition
that is acceptable to the realtor that is selected by the parties.

~

6. The parties shall mutually agree upon the realtor selected to
sell the home and each shall cooperate to get the home sold
so that the equity can be taken out of the home and divided as

~

ordered in paragraph 4{b).

7. If there is a problem that develops and the realtor is of the
ii
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opinion that the home is not being sold because it is being
lived it, the parties can address the issue with the Court by
providing the Court with the information from the realtor.
8. Petitioner's request for $5,328.00 in mortgage payments that
she paid while Respondent was residing in the home shall not
be granted. Respondent is responsible for the $200.00 a
month to be paid toward the monthly mortgage payment as
previously ordered in paragraph 4(b)(i), but no further
recoupment is ordered.
INHERITANCE
.t

9. As to the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, the
Partnership was an inheritance.
10. All of the monies the came from the partnership and
distributions out of the partnership, not including gifts from the
mother that came from her personal assets, were the
Petitioner's inheritance.
11. In trying to reconcile Exhibit (Schedule) A to the Smith Family
Trust, the Court looked at number 4 on Exhibit (Schedule) A,
which states "All right, title and interest in and to the following:
All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family
Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership."
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12. All interest of Sharon L. Smith in the Luveda Fincher Family
Limited Partnership included distributions and they were
simply part of the partnership.
13. The Court is interpreting number 4 of Exhibit (Schedule) A to
mean all the distributions belong to Petitioner.
14. The language of number 2 of Exhibit (Schedule A) was for
other assets but did not include interest in the Luveda Fincher
Family Limited Partnership.
15. In order to pay family expenses, Petitioner used some
proceeds until 2012 when the large amount came in. She used
those for the family to survive. Those amounts were
comingled, but Petitioner did not comingle the larger payment
of $750,000.00 that was distributed from the partnership, and
that remains as the Petitioner's sole and separate property.
16. Petitioner is entitled to funds in the Zions and LPL (formerly
Edward Jones) account and the accounts are the sole
property of the Petitioner.
ALIMONY

17. Respondent has medical circumstances and receives Social
Security Disability in the amount of $1,198.00 per month as a
result of those circumstances.
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18. Respondent has unmet needs.
19. Petitioner's separate property is considered in determining the
unmet needs of Respondent.
20. Respondent's declaration has overstated his needs.
Therefore his needs are set at $1,700.00 per month.
21. Respondent's income is $11 198.00 per month and that his
unmet expenses are $1,700.00 per month leaving a need for
alimony in the amount of $502.00 per month.
22. Petitioner shall pay alimony to Respondent in the amount of
$502.00 per month, not to exceed the length of the marriage .
.r

Alimony shall terminate upon death, remarriage, or
cohabitation by the Respondent.
ATTORNEY FEES

23. Each party shall pay their own attorney fees and costs
incurred in this action.
Approved as to Form and Content
/s/ Michael D. Black
Electronically signed by Jaime Topham with permission of Michael D. Black
Attorney for Respondent
END OF ORDER
In accordance with the Utah State District Court's Efiling Standard No. 4,
and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 10(e), this Order does not bear the
handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an electronic
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signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this Order.
***'lrlrlr******H*'lrk'k*irlrlt******H****
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

@

}

SHARON SMITH,

Petitioner,
vs.
KEITH SMITH,

Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

***PRIVATE***

Case No. 134300466
@

)
)

ORIGINAL

Bench Trial
Electronically Recorded on
February 12, 2015

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE ROBERT ADKINS
Third District Court Judge

.. t

APPEARANCES

For the Petitioner:

Jaime D. Topham
291 North Race Street
Grantsville, Utah 84029
Telephone: (435) 884-3428

For the Respondent:

Michael D. Black
PARR, BROWN
101 South 200 East, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7840

Transcribed by: Wendy Haws, CCT
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Telephone: (801) 377-2927
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1

has a bank account right at the moment or controls these bank

2

accounts with some $600,000 in them.

3

hand,

4

as his only income.

5

come out to me.

is barely scraping by with his Social Security disability

6
7

My client, on the other

So it seems pretty clear how that should

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Topham, you may call your

first witness.

8

MS. TOPHAM: Your Honor,

9

THE COURT: Ma'am if you'd come forward and be sworn

10

I'd call Sharon Smith.

please.

11

COURT CLERK: Please raise your right hand.

Do you

12

solemnly swear the testimony you shall give in this case shall

13

be the truth,

the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so
.t

14

help you God?

15

THE WITNESS: Yes.

16

COURT CLERK: Have a seat.

17

MS. TOPHAM: Your Honor, if I may approach.

18

THE COURT: You may.

Thank you.

19

SHARON SMITH,

20

having been first duly sworn,

21

testified as follows:

22

DIRECT EXAMINATION

23

24
25

BY MS. TOPHAM:
Q.

Good morning.

Can you please state your name for the

record.
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1

2

A.

Yes, he actually wrote it to me in a letter saying
that it was my inheritance.

that it was

3

Q.

So he understood that to be your inheritance?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Do you recall when he told you that?

6

A.

About 2005.

7

Q.

Is that about the time that there was this turmoil?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Okay, you said that Keith quit running the business

10
11

in 2005.
A.

Did he find employment after he quit his business?
No, that's when we started seeing a marriage counselor

12

and this counselor advised him that possibly he could go on

13

disability.

14

Q.

Okay, did he end up getting disability?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Okay,

17

excuse me,

18

recognize that document?

19

20

··'

A.

if you can turn to page 2 in that binder --

in tab 2 of that binder in front of you, do you

Yes,

this is the Smith Family Trust that we had done

in 2006.

21

Q.

Did an attorney draft that trust for you?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Had you ever dealt with the attorney before?

24

A.

No, he was just recommended by a mutual friend.

25

Q.

Why did you and Keith want a trust?

-25-
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1

Q.

Do you know how much you earned last year?

2

A.

I don't remember; 6 -- maybe 6,000, something like

3
4
5

that.
Q.

There has been talk of this inheritance.

You said

that your mom had passed away in 2011, correct?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Did you receive a distribution from the partnership

8
9

after that?

A.

Yes,

in -- after she passed away the partnership had

10

some property and so they sold that property and I received

11

this large distribution in October of 2012.

12

Q.

What did you do with that?

13

A.

I received it by check in the mail .

14

Q.

Was it addressed to you?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

To anyone

17

A.

Only to me.

18

Q.

What did you do with that check?

19

A.

I took that check and deposited it into Zion's Bank

How did you receive it?

•t

20

into two money market accounts.

21

Q.

Were those accounts that had previously existed?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

What was the purpose of opening those accounts?

24

A.

To make them distinguished from our joint account, and

25

basically -- and then later --

-33-
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Was it -- oh, I don't want to tell you.

1

Q.

2

A.

later put them -- put them in the trust, yeah.

3

Q.

So was it your intention to keep your inheritance

4

separate?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Did you have any option besides -- when you received

7

that check, did you have any option but to open a financial

8

account to deal with that check?

9

A.

Well, then later I -- after talking to several

10

financial planners, then I invested part of it in -- with a

11

financial planner in -- it's now in an LPL Finance -- it's LPL

12

financial company.

13

Q.

Okay, but when you actually received the check, could

.,

14

you just go and cash that check, or did you have to deposit it

15

into a

16

A.

Oh, no.

17

Q.

-- a financial account?

18

A.

No, no.

19

It has to -- it had to be -- no one would

cash that big of a check.

It had to be --

20

Q.

21

A.

22

Q.

Into a financial account?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

A.

Yes.

So you had -it had to be deposited.

-34-
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1

correct?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Then the second one that's listed for Zion's Bank,

4
5

6
7

8

9
10

are those the money market accounts you've been talking about?
A.

Yes, except for I initially had two, and now I only

have one.
Q.

The current balance of those is listed at $171,068.19;

is that correct?

A.

Approximate, yeah.

It could -- it's probably lower

than that, but approximate, yeah.

11

Q.

On the next page, then, you have listed LPL Financial?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

That is the brokerage account?

14

A.

Yes, that's my investment, yes.

15

Q.

That used to be Edward Jones, correct?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

That's listed-- has a balance of $422,159.21, correct?

18

A.

Correct.

19

Q.

So if my math is correct, then, we're talking about

.r

20

$593,000 and change?

21

A.

More or less.

22

Q.

More or less, okay.

23

A.

Mostly yes, probably.

24

Q.

Now, in 1999 I think you testified that you received

25

distributions from family limited -- from your family partner-
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1

in Logan, and he -- he withdrew the -- the total amount of the

2

loan

3

for the whole month, and that's when he was -- got mad at me

4

and was upset at me because I had taken that job.

the total amount of the $5,000 out of the bank account

So he went and withdrew that money out of the checking

5

6

account, and he went and bought an old truck that he wanted,

7

and he -- then he threatened divorce and said that -- excuse

8

me.

9

-- basically to see that I loved money more than him, or some-

10

thing to that effect.

11

12

Then he later told me that he was testing me to see that

Q.

You were angry with him when he made that withdrawal,

correct?

13

A.

Right.

14

Q.

In fact, because of that, you went to hire a divorce

15

attorney at that time; is that right?

16

A.

17

a divorce.

18

Q.

But you worked that out in 2005?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Then in 2006, it was -- the marital trust was an idea

21

That's right, because he said that he was going to get
So

I

decided

I

might as well go first.

that you had come up with first; isn't that right?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

You found the lawyer who was going to draft it for

A.

Well, he was a mutual -- a mutual friend recommended

24
25

you?
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1

him.

2

Q.

You were the one paying him to do this work?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

We've looked at a few of the provisions of that trust

5

agreement, and I believe it is in front of you as Exhibit 2.

6

I'd like you,

7

which is right in the middle of this thing, but I believe it's

8

right after page 27.

9

10

A.
one.

if you would, to flip back to that Schedule A,

Can you --

I can't find it again.

I realized I didn't like this

Okay.

11

Q.

Have you found Schedule A?

12

A.

Schedule A or page 2?

13

Q.

Schedule A, the quitclaim document that we were -- you

Oh, okay.

.t

14

were discussing with your attorney earlier.

15
16

A.

No,

Do you have that?

I'm not sure I have the right one.

There's too

many Schedule A's.

17

Q.

18

the series.

All right,

I think it's the very first Schedule A in

19

A.

Oh, okay.

20

Q.

All right, you're there with me?

21

A.

About the house?

22

Q.

It's -- the first page has the house at the bottom of

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

You talked about the operation and what the initials

23

Okay.

it?
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1

2

Q.

Well, what about those two initials needs -- requires

interpretation?

3

A.

Because I think it means a joint account.

4

Q.

Well, do you see the word "joint account" anywhere in

5

6

paragraph 2?
A.

No, but I still think it's a matter of interpretation,

7

and I'm not a law-- I'm not an attorney to-- or a trust writer,

8

and I just felt like that because you go down to

9

pointed out, and you go down to A, and it -- and it conflicts

like Jaime

10

with what is said in 2.

11

don't feel like this guy wrote it very plainly that -- because

12

it can be interpreted different ways.

13

Q.

So I don't feel like that this -- I

But what I'm asking right now is under the ownership

··'
14

portion where it's got the line there that says "KLS and SLS,

15

that would indicate that it is split jointly, correct?

16

A.

Okay, correct.

17

Q.

The Tooele Credit -- Federal Credit Union, that's the

18

one that at that time you -- was a joint account with Keith?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

That's the account at that time that the distributions

21

from the partnership were going into?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

And any paychecks were going into?

24

A.

Well,

25

Q.

Any income from his businesses would have gone into

in 2006 I didn't have a paycheck, but yes.
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1

Q.

2

right?

3

A.

We went to therapy over the issue of divorce?

4

Q.

Over the issues that you were having?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Sharon sought out a divorce at that time,

7

A.

Correct.

8

Q.

Ultimately, obviously, you did not divorce, right?

9

A.

Correct.

10

Q.

When you went and -- when the trust was created, did

11

Okay, but you guys went to therapy over the issue,

correct?

you read that trust, the Smith Family Trust?

12

A.

No.

13

Q•

You signed -- did you sign the trust?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Can you turn in the white binder that's in plaintiff's

•t

16

exhibits -- or petitioner's exhibits, can you turn to the --

17

A.

Are you -- oh, oh,

18

Q.

Can you turn to the second trust agreement, second

I see.

I understand.

19

document?

20

A.

The one with --

21

Q.

Yes.

22

A.

It doesn't have page num -- oh,

23

Can you turn to page 26.
now they're coming.

Page 26?

(i)

24

Q.

Yes.

25

A.

Yes,

Is that your signature?
it is.
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1
2

Q.

Can you turn three more pages.

That would be page 2

of Schedule A.

3

A.

Page 2 of Schedule A?

4

Q.

Yes, is that your signature on that page?

5

A.

Yes, it is.

6

Q.

Earlier you testified the house had been previously --

7

prior to this trust, the house had been previously transferred

8

to Sharon's name alone; is that correct?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Why did you do that?

11

A.

When I was in business, I was afraid that being in

12

environmental cleanup, that we would -- it's possible to get

13

sued, and I did not want our personal assets endangered.

14

··'
Q.

So it's your testimony that you had transferred the

15

house out of your name into Sharon's alone, to protect the

16

assets from creditors, correct?

17

A.

No, not from creditors.

18

Q.

From potential liability?

19

A.

Lawsuits.

20

Q.

Okay, from potential lawsuits.

21

Your testimony is, is

that happened long before the 2006 trust?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Okay, are you sure about that?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Do you recall signing a quitclaim deed in October of
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1

Let's first talk about the family trust and these

2

financial accounts.

3

provision, this quitclaim schedule to the family trust, the

4

Smith Family Trust that says that the parties are quit-claiming

5

and deeding to the other one of those assets.

6

assets is the house, and that went to Sharon.

7

As the Court is now seeing, there is this

One of those

No. 2 on the list of that quitclaim deed are financial

8

accounts.

9

agreement, it very clearly states that all financial accounts,

As I read to the Court and as is plain from that

10

whether they exist now, whether they exist in the future,

11

whether they're at a different institution, whether they're

12

at the same institution, and all additions and accumulations

13

to those accounts are split equally, which was the custom of

14

the parties at the time that they entered into that agreement.

15

It's not -- it's not an ambiguous provisions.

There's

16

no room for interpretation in it.

17

that somehow the word "joint" should be stuffed into that --

18

into that language finds no support in the language that exists

19

there.

20

that language is the fourth item on that list, which as the

21

membership interest itself in the partnership remains the

22

petitioner's property.

23

The petitioner's proposition

Her only argument as to a different interpretation for

Those two things are not incompatible.

The membership

24

interest, the actual interest in the entity clearly remains

25

with the petitioner, with Sharon.

However, once those distri-
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1

butions come out, and they were getting them and they were

2

using them for marital purposes, they were dividing them

3

jointly.

4

when we have talk of financial accounts, those financial

5

accounts are split and are dealt with differently than the

6

membership interest itself.

So it makes perfect sense that in that provision

7

Notably, the language describing the membership

8

interest does not include proceeds, distributions or any

9

sort of terminology of the like, even though it's clear that

10

the attorney who wrote that provision knew how to use that

11

language because he had used accumulations, additions and the

12

like prior.

13

So it's not -- it's not unclear at all, or ambiguous
.t

14

at all what the family trust and that particular quitclaim

15

provision requires.

16

if we want to call them that or just agreements between married

17

persons are enforceable like normal contracts, absent fraud,

18

coercion or material non-disclosure.

19

These agreements, post-nuptial agreements,

That's according to the Utah Court of Appeals in

20

Daston v. Daston, 808 P2d. 111.

21

evaluated according to normal contract principals, including

22

the principal that if it's unambiguous language, it's inter-

23

preted according to its normal and objective terminology and

24

meaning of those words that are used.

25

the day, looking at that provision and applying the contract

They are interpreted and

I think at the end of
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1

principals that apply in Utah,

2

required that these financial accounts be divided between

3

those parties equally.

4

it is -- it's clear that it

Even if we get beyond that point, there is the issue

5

of comingling.

6

169, so again the Utah Court of Appeals, premarital property

7

loses its separate distinction when the parties have inextric-

8

ably comingled it, or when one spouse has contributed all or

9

part of the property to the marital estate.

10

Now, according to Kiter v. Kiter, 2010 Utah App

So when we're looking at -- when I'm looking at co-

ll

mingling in this circumstance, I think there's two aspects to

12

it.

13

course of conduct of the parties shows that they were treating

14

all of this inheritance money, all of this money that was

15

coming in from this partnership, as a marital asset.

16

petitioner was putting it into a joint account.

17

used for marital purposes.

It was being used to pay the mort-

18

gage, to pay normal bills.

That satisfies the issue of co-

19

mingling as to the entirety of the inheritance that would come

20

in.

One is that the -- the inheritance money as a whole, the

··'

The

It was being

21

Also, when we're looking at comingling, we can look at

22

just the period of time when the final distribution, the really

23

large distribution comes in, and we can look at where did it

24

go, and what accounts did it actually go into.

25

So what the facts show is that Sharon had opened this
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1

the parties.

2

the home sold so that the equity can be taken out of the home

3

and divided as the Court has ordered.

4

So I'm expecting both parties to cooperate to get

If there is a problem that develops, and if the realtor

5

is of the opinion that the home is not being sold because it's

6

being lived in rather than vacant, we can readdress that.

7

Counsel can simply call the Court, and we can resolve that

8

issue, and you can provide me with the information from the

9

realtor, and we can make a decision on that.

10

As to the family partnership that was created --

11

MS. TOPHAM: Your Honor, could I interrupt just a

@

12
•r

moment?

13

THE COURT: Certainly .

14

MS. TOPHAM: You didn't actually state what -- how the

15
16

proceeds would be ultimately divided.
THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry,

I intended that they would

17

be divided 50/50 subject to those amounts that your client is

18

going to recoup from Mr. Smith's portion of the equity.

19

MS. TOPHAM: Thank you.

20

THE COURT: That as to the family partnership, the

21

Court believes that this was an inheritance, and the way the

22

Court views it is that the petitioner's mother helped the

23

parties, and the Court believes that that was appropriate.

24

There was a need there that the petitioner's mother addressed,

25

and that it's nice to have someone in the family that's in that
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1

ability to assist when there is a need like this.

2

The Court finds that the-- that all of the monies that

3

came from the partnership, and that -- and I'm not including in

4

there gifts from the mother that came from her personal assets

5

rather than distributions out of the partnership, but as to the

6

distributions out of the partnership, the Court believes that

7

they were the petitioner's inheritance.

8

9

In trying to reconcile Exhibit A to the Smith Family
Trust, the Court is looking at No. 4 on Exhibit A, and it says,

10

"All interest, title and interest in the following," and then

11

it says, "All interest of Sharon L. Smith in the Lavida Fincher

12

Family Limited Partnership, an Arizona limited partnership,"

13

and that was to go to Mrs. Smith.

14

.,

The Court believes that all interest in the -- of

15

Sharon L. Smith in the Lavida Fincher Family Limited Partner-

16

ship included distributions.

17

the partnership, and the Court is interpreting No. 4 to mean

18

all those distributions were Ms. Smith's.

19

that the language in No. 2 at Exhibit A was for other assets,

20

but did not include the interest in the Lavida Fincher Family

21

Limited Partnership.

22

That they were simply part of

The Court believes

The Court finds that in order to pay the family

23

expenses that Ms. Smith used some of those proceeds up until

24

I guess probably 2012 when the large amount came in.

25

those to -- for the family to survive, and the Court believes

She used
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